

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	ix
Introduction: Policing Interwar Europe	1
<i>Gerald Blaney, Jr</i>	
1 The Difficult Construction of a ‘Republican’ Police: The Experience of the French Third Republic	14
<i>Jean-Marc Berlière</i>	
A Republican police?	14
Caught between the ‘municipal principle’ and the temptation to centralize	16
Defending the Republic	19
Keeping a Republican order or Republican order-keeping?	20
The only police force a democracy can own up to?	22
The police and the Third Republic: a case of successful acculturation?	24
2 Keeping Order in Republican Spain, 1931–36	31
<i>Gerald Blaney, Jr</i>	
Assessing Republican power	32
Reforming the police, 1931–33	36
A Republican failure?: the thorny issue of police violence	42
‘Rectifying’ reforms: the governments of the Center-Right	49
Swimming against the current?: the Popular Front, February–July 1936	52
Conclusion	57
3 Prussian Police Reform and the Modernization of the Academy Classroom: The Advent of the German Police Training Film, 1919–20	69
<i>Sara F. Hall</i>	
Reform through re-education	70
A partisan journalistic view	73
In the classroom	75
Introducing the police training film	77
Criminal investigation and technology	78

	Standardization and mobility	82
	The latest and the best	84
	Conclusion	86
4	Guardians of the Republic? Portugal's Guarda Nacional Republicana and the Politicians during the 'New Old Republic', 1919–22	90
	<i>Stewart Lloyd-Jones and Diego Palacios Cerezales</i>	
	The creation of the GNR	91
	Portugal's civil war and its consequences	95
	Aftermath	103
	Conclusion	104
5	Mussolini's Policemen, 1922–43	112
	<i>Jonathan Dunnage</i>	
	The creation of a police force at the service of the Fascist regime	114
	The 'Fascistization' of policemen	120
	The case of Riccardo Secreti	126
	Conclusion	130
6	Police, Republic and Nation: The Czechoslovak State Police and the Building of a Multinational Democracy, 1918–25	136
	<i>Samuel Ronsin</i>	
	The State Police and the new Republic, October 1918–March 1920	138
	Creating a 'national police': the deployment of the State Police	141
	Recruitment practices of the State Police	145
	Conclusion	154
7	Police and Policing under the Second Polish Republic, 1918–39	159
	<i>Andrzej Misiuk</i>	
	The troubled birth of the Polish Republic, 1918–26	160
	The Sanacja regime, 1926–39	165
	Epilogue: defending Poland	169
8	Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde Revisited: Policing Interwar Bulgaria	172
	<i>Dimcho N. Dimov</i>	
	Historical background	172

War crises, internal security and public order	175
The rule of the democratic alliance, 1923–31	178
The People's Bloc government, 1931–34	181
The coup d'état of 19 May 1934	185
The 'monarcho-fascist' rule of Boris III, 1935–39	186
Conclusion	188
9 'Turbulent Times': The Dutch Police Between the Two World Wars	192
<i>Jos Smeets</i>	
The threat of revolution and the Dutch police	192
Building barricades against revolution: the Central Intelligence Bureau, the Politietroepen and the National Reserve	196
The debate over the nature and the reform of the Dutch police	198
The economic crisis of 1929 and its repercussions	202
The mutiny on the HMS <i>Seven Provinces</i> and the Jordaan uprising of 1934	203
The decree on the State Police and the Donner Commission	205
The Oss affair of 1938	207
Conclusion	211
10 Traffic, Telephones and Police Boxes: The Deterioration of Beat Policing in Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester Between the World Wars	215
<i>Joanne Klein</i>	
Pressures on beat policing before the First World War	216
Police strikes of 1918 and 1919	217
The 1919 Police Act	219
Traffic burdens	220
Rising public expectations of public services	223
New laws and paperwork	224
Telephones and police boxes	225
Declining police morale	228
New internal police rivalries	229
<i>Index</i>	237

Introduction: Policing Interwar Europe

Gerald Blaney, Jr

While relatively understudied by scholars, the issue of policing and public order in interwar Europe is a crucial one given the political, social and economic tensions of the period. The lack of a firm and broad political consensus across the continent in the wake of the First World War led to attempts by both governments and opposition movements to establish one, either through democratic means or the use of coercion. While old and new democracies were broadening the political process to allow for the participation of previously excluded social groups, the inheritance of the past brought with it obstacles which could disturb, if not cut short, this development. European statesmen often struggled to convince these previously marginalized groups that they should formulate and pursue their social and political objectives within the parameters of liberal parliamentary democracy, a problem they also encountered when dealing with conservative sectors of society. Their efforts were made all the more difficult by the social and economic dislocations caused by the war, which frequently found their political expression in undemocratic terms. The emergence of mass opposition movements challenged the apparent ideological hegemony of liberalism, and their paramilitary militias challenged the hegemony of the state's control of the streets. High levels of disorder and political violence, alongside increases in strike activity and revolutionary rhetoric, served to undermine the legitimacy of liberal democratic regimes, often to the benefit of the authoritarian and fascist Right.

Indeed, 'order' was a precious commodity in this era of uncertainty and instability. In such an environment, the security forces that guarded the political order played a vital role. The police's role as the 'first line of defense' against challenges to the political establishment

made them an essential instrument in these tumultuous times. The political philosopher Hannah Arendt has noted that

In a contest of violence against violence the superiority of the government has always been absolute; but this superiority lasts only as long as the power structure of the government is intact – that is, as long as commands are obeyed and the army and police forces are prepared to use their weapons. When this is no longer the case, the situation changes abruptly.¹

The truth of Arendt's observation was recognized at the time. After a visit to a turbulent Germany immediately following the signing of the Armistice, the British journalist George Young wrote of the new Weimar Republic: 'Weak as it is politically, the present German governmental system seems too strong police-ically to be overthrown by force.'² This assessment was echoed by the Nazi leader Joseph Goebbels in his *Instructions to the SA Man* (1927):

At the present time, all resistance against the police and the state is senseless, because you will always be weaker than they. No matter who is right, the state has the power to retaliate against you and the Party with prison sentences and heavy fines. When there is no other way, therefore, submit to superior strength and merely remember that one day the time of reckoning will be here.³

The importance of having sympathetic men in charge of the police during periods of political uncertainty and fluidity was seen as essential for both governments and, particularly, opposition movements. Indeed, the dismissal of police chiefs could spark off major protests, or even attempted coups, as occurred with the dismissals of the head of the Parisian Prefect of Police, Jean Chiappe, in February 1934 and the Austrian Director of Public Security, Major Emil Fey in July 1934.⁴

While the threat from the authoritarian or fascist Right proved the greater danger for democracy, it was the menace posed by Communism that most occupied the minds of European statesmen. The wave of social unrest that followed the end of the First World War was often characterized (primarily by more conservative groups) as 'bolshevik', and the shadowy presence of Communism continued to be seen by such sectors of opinion behind any subsequent outbursts of disorder throughout the interwar period, regardless of whether the Communists were the main protagonists or not. The collapse of first

the Romanov dynasty and then its liberal democratic successor became the frame of reference for statesmen at the time, who hoped to avoid such an outcome in their own countries. One of the principle lessons learned from the Russian example in 1917 was the need for a strong and disciplined police apparatus. Consequently, virtually every European country rapidly and substantially increased the size of their police personnel and established rapid-action anti-disturbance squads. Political police forces were granted ever-greater resources, and most states re-organized their police apparatuses to concentrate control in the hands of the central government. Most police forces were increasingly militarized in order to prevent infiltration by subversive (i.e. Communist) elements, and several countries even passed legislation to regulate and protect the integrity of the police and armed forces by outlawing the diffusion of anti-government propaganda amongst its personnel and efforts to unionize them.

Concerns over the loyalty of the police to the political order were felt most acutely in the new democracies, where the longevity of their recently-established regimes seemed uncertain. Yet, even a country such as Britain, which prided itself on the civilian and democratic character of its police, was not immune to these trends. As overt militarization would have met with determined opposition in Parliament and elsewhere, the British authorities took a more indirect path. In the wake of the 1918–19 police strikes, the government put forward a Police Bill which prohibited police officers from belonging to a union and stipulated penalties – including imprisonment – for any one who fomented disaffection amongst the police. The rationale behind these and similar measures was clear: In the words of Prime Minister Lloyd George, describing the first police strike in 1918, '[t]his country was nearer to Bolshevism that day than at any time since'.⁵ Even the Parliamentary Labour Party was cautious about allowing the police to unionize. Arthur Henderson, Home Secretary under the 1924 Labour government, made the following statement in the House of Commons during a debate on providing assistance to those police officers who were dismissed for their involvement in the 1919 strike:

I have been a trade unionist for 41 years but ... I draw a very wide distinction between an ordinary industrial dispute and a strike in what is a disciplinary service like the police force. Those of us who are prepared to bring about changes, either political or industrial, on constitutional lines, cannot make too clear the difference between the position of the military, the position of the police or the

position ... of the fire brigade, so far as taking up a 'down tools' policy is concerned.⁶

With the exception of Britain, all of the liberal democratic regimes faced the issue of gaining and/or retaining police loyalty to the regime. Generally speaking, police forces sought to position themselves on the winning side of the political battle, even if this meant siding with those political forces that they had traditionally opposed or persecuted, as happened in 1918 in Germany and most of Central/Eastern Europe, 1926 in Poland, and 1931 in Spain, amongst other examples. Yet, despite this pragmatism, there existed a certain temptation amongst policemen towards authoritarian solutions to society's problems, partly due to the prevalence of undemocratic attitudes and practices inherited from the past, and partly due to frustration amongst many policemen at the seemingly incessant civil strife which plagued many democratic regimes. Just as the apparent successes of (undemocratic) revolutionary Communism remained a tempting model for sectors of the working classes, the apparent successes of (undemocratic) counter-revolutionary fascism exercised a certain influence over the thinking of many police officers.

In several ways, the situation facing French Republicans in the latter half of the nineteenth century was similar to those facing democratic statesmen of the 1920s and 1930s across Europe. Following the pattern first established in the French Revolution, perceived episodes of disorder were almost inevitably followed by a 'Thermidorian' reaction, which set in place the process whereby more authoritarian elements would hijack political power. The Second Empire, for example, had its roots in the unrest following the 1848 Revolution, and when Napoleon III toppled the Second Republic, he enjoyed the support of many within the French police as well as the French population as a whole.⁷ Similarly, the violence surrounding the Paris Commune in 1871 had threatened to undermine the Third Republic in a France that was yet to be won over to republicanism.⁸ Moreover, up to this point the Republicans had a strained relationship with the police – the latter seeing the former as the 'partisans of disorder'. The Republican authorities quickly learned that they would need the support of the security forces if the new regime were to survive.

It was this attempt to 'republicanize' the police that Jean-Marc Berlière discusses in Chapter 1. In order to do this, French republicans recognized that there was a need not only to reform and reorganize the structure of the police, but to convince the French police forces of the

viability and superiority of democratic republicanism, and develop new policing tactics that reflected the ethos of the new political order. Indeed, the positive working relationship that emerged from this process of mutual 'acculturation' between Republican politicians and the police served the regime well during the various crises and challenges that it faced during its seventy-year history. Nonetheless, as Berlière notes, a certain caution must be observed when assessing the permeation of Republican ideals within the police during the interwar period. After years of mounting social and political conflict, many police officers had few qualms, at least initially, about serving the authoritarian Vichy regime that replaced it. Thus, it would appear that even the level of 'republicanization' of the French police was ultimately dependent on the regime's ability to effectively deal with high levels of unrest and provide some sort of stability.

The Spanish and German republicans of the interwar period sought to imitate the successes achieved by their French counterparts. In Chapter 2, Gerald Blaney describe the efforts of the statesmen of the Spanish Second Republic to exercise greater control over those police forces inherited from the fallen monarchy. State control of the police was deemed crucial for the long-term survival of the new regime and the realization of its reformist agenda, which included redefining the relationship between the state and its citizens. The Spanish republicans faced considerable obstacles in the shape of political fragmentation (which fairly rapidly converted into polarization), the high expectations of the poorer sections of society, the intransigence of traditional elites, and the lukewarm loyalty of the army and security forces. Given the long history of intervention by the Spanish Army in the political process, the predominant danger facing Spanish Republicans was that of a right-wing military coup. Thus emphasis was placed by the Republicans on structural issues that were meant to bolster civilian authority, such as reducing the competencies of the military authorities over the police and public order and strengthening those of the Interior Ministry. Nonetheless, these attempts at structural reforms were not given enough time to realize their objectives, as changes in the political composition of the government, such as occurred between September 1933 and February 1936, often translated into a diluting, if not abrogation, of these reforms. The undermining of those positive reforms that were implemented in the first two years of the Republic, the willingness of important sectors within Spanish society to encourage the military to 'save' the nation, and an increase in political violence and social unrest meant that many policemen joined the ranks of

the military rebels when the latter rose against the government in July 1936.

Spain was not the only country with a history of military interference in civilian politics, though perhaps such activity was more pronounced there. In Germany, the Versailles Treaty resolved, to an extent, the problem of an unaccountable and politically influential military. This allowed the statesmen of the Weimar Republic to focus on other aspects of police reform such as education and training. In Chapter 3, Sara Hall describes how the Republican authorities, in conjunction with reform-minded officers within the police corps, used modern innovations such as film to achieve their goals of professionalizing and democratizing their police. These efforts were also meant to serve as an example of the progressive and efficacious nature of the Weimar Republic to the population as a whole. Yet, ultimately, these admirable efforts failed to take root and overcome the increasing alienation within the police by the end of the 1920s, a development that reflected the broader crises afflicting German society, and a relative lack of firm commitment to the Weimar regime.

One strategy that was not forcefully pursued by the French, Spanish or German republican regimes was the wholesale purge of police personnel. There were several reasons for this, including the short-term objective of not wanting to alienate the police during the process of regime consolidation, the concern to keep the police as politically neutral as possible, and the desire to instill an institutional culture of bureaucratic professionalism over the long term. As such, they opted for a policy of altering existing institutional cultures, a strategy that not only required time to set in but which also depended on the ability of the existing regime to prove its resilience. Faced with an increasingly threatening political situation by the end of the First World War, the Portuguese Republicans chose a different path. As Stewart Lloyd-Jones and Diego Palacios Cerezales illustrate in Chapter 4, the decision by Portuguese Republicans (particularly those of the ironically named 'Democrat' faction) to charge the state police force, the *Guarda Nacional Republicana* (GNR), with the explicit role of protecting the Republic backfired as it enabled and encouraged the GNR to intervene in the political process. Taking on the characteristics of a political militia rather than that of a professional police force, the GNR soon slipped the leash of its superiors and became the arbiter of Portuguese politics from 1919 to 1922, all in the name of 'defending the Republic'. Indeed, it was only with much difficulty and some cunning political maneuvering that the civilian politicians of the First

Republic were able to regain control of Portugal's most important police force.

The Italian Fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini, was aware of the potential danger posed by paramilitary forces not completely under the control of the government, such as his own party's militias. After centralizing the structure of the Fascist Party in December 1922, Mussolini integrated the various Blackshirt militias, which were previously under the control of local party leaders, under the command of professional military officers and absorbed into the apparatus of the Italian state.⁹ On the one hand, Mussolini's position *vis-à-vis* the traditional establishment was still relatively weak and therefore obliged him to rein in party hotheads. On the other, Mussolini's objective, as with many other pretenders to political power, was to conquer the central state and use the resources at its disposal to carry out their respective agendas, not to undermine the machinery of that very same state. The existence of autonomous civilian militias that could challenge the state's monopoly over the exercise of violent force could, and often did, prove troublesome if not counterproductive, even when these bodies were linked to those in power. The existence of such groups was particularly threatening to a regime in the process of consolidation or in a period of crisis. As a result, most regimes, whatever their political persuasion, continued to rely on the traditional apparatuses of state coercion, namely the very same police forces inherited from the previous regime.

Mussolini's ability to rely on the police apparatus inherited from his liberal predecessors (though not without some tinkering) was due to the fact that by 1922 many police officers were alienated from the liberal regime, sympathetic to fascism's objective of restoring order and shared many of its values, such as anti-Marxism and nationalism.¹⁰ A program of overt 'fascistization' of the police after coming to power would have needlessly antagonized Mussolini's supporters from within the existing establishment. At any rate, it was largely unnecessary. As Jonathan Dunnage shows us in Chapter 5, Mussolini adopted a pragmatic policy of rewarding outstanding service to the Fascist regime over that of absolute ideological conformity with the Fascist Party. A process of formal fascistization of the police only began after the Fascist Party was already tamed and integrated into the state. As a result, there was a great deal of continuity of personnel from the previous liberal regime. Those policemen who found themselves dismissed from service were just as likely to have been punished for reasons of incompetence or corruption as any political foible. This continuity of

personnel was also evident after the fall of the Fascist regime when men who were not overly compromised by the regime were able to take advantage of post-Fascist Italy's need for a disciplined and experienced police force.

In Chapter 6, Samuel Ronsin shows that the statesmen of the Republic of Czechoslovakia pursued a course similar to those adopted by Spain, Germany and, to an extent, Italy. Not only were purges of police personnel kept to a minimum, there was a marked unwillingness to dislodge those police officers inherited from the Habsburg Monarchy and replace them with personnel firmly committed to the Czech cause, such as former members of the Czechoslovak Legion. While ex-Legionnaires were legally granted a privileged position within the state bureaucracy, they found themselves facing a wall of resistance from pre-independence officials within the higher echelons of the hierarchy. These officials saw the ex-Legionnaires as a threat to their careers and viewed the concept of promoting men on the basis of their beliefs, instead of experience, as the very antithesis of a professional bureaucracy. Moreover, there existed other groups seeking placement in the rapidly expanding State Police, some of whom, such as personnel of newly nationalized municipal police forces, felt that their experience merited them special consideration for recruitment. Faced with border disputes and dissident minorities, Czech politicians did not want to aggravate the emerging divisions within the police nor staff their police forces with men of dubious qualifications at the very moment when what they needed most were reliable, professional and experienced police forces. Accordingly, they turned a deaf ear to the complaints of ex-Legionnaires, whose potential political influence as a pressure group was also a concern.

The Polish Second Republic faced similar problems to its Czechoslovak neighbor, though perhaps of an even greater magnitude. Czechoslovak statesmen had to construct a new administration out of the old imperial one, and their task was complicated by the fact that, under the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, the Czech and Slovak lands were administered separately by Vienna and Budapest, respectively. The new Polish state emerged from under the tripartite occupation of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, and thus had to create a single administration out of three. Moreover, while the Polish authorities, like their Czechoslovak counterparts, had to deal with border disputes and dissident national minorities, the Polish situation was further complicated by the struggle over the political character of the new state. Two major opposing political factions were established from

the very inception of the Polish state, each with their own strongman and policing bodies. As Andrzej Misiuk notes in Chapter 7, despite the centralization and militarization of the Polish State Police, this force was not immune to the larger political environment, particularly as many of its recruits came from the more conservative faction surrounding Roman Dmowski. Indeed, as Misiuk points out, the *Policja Państwowa* were not adverse to interfering in political affairs. This politicization became more pronounced after the May 1926 coup that brought Marshal Józef Piłsudski to power. In his quest to ‘cleanse’ Polish politics, Piłsudski and his successors pursued a gradual course of marginalizing and persecuting their opponents. The police were not immune to this process. Recognizing that the majority of the police sympathized with his political rivals, Piłsudski carried out a purge of police personnel and encouraged the political indoctrination of the police. The identification of the ‘purification’ (*sanacja*) process with the person of Piłsudski, as well as the placing of military officers loyal to the Marshal in command of the police, meant that a politicized Polish police were never granted a separate role as the ultimate defenders of the *sanacja*, and thus did not emulate the actions of the Portuguese GNR.

The republics of Czechoslovakia and Poland differed from their counterparts in France, Spain and Germany in that they were new states as well as new regimes. As mentioned above, they both faced the problem of national consolidation as well as political consolidation. The presence of a large German minority in Czechoslovakia – not to mention the rather artificial construct of a Czech-Slovak nation – and a significant Ukrainian minority in Poland (to name the largest minority groups in each country) meant that ethnic considerations could take precedence over questions of political ideology. While, for reasons stated above, political factors played an increasing role in the Polish police after 1926, the principal motivation behind the structure and the recruitment of the police in both countries appears to have been ethnicity. Czech and Polish recruits were favored over applicants coming from one of the national minorities, and both states maintained highly centralized police apparatuses, whose hierarchies were dominated by Czechs and Poles, respectively. In Czechoslovakia this meant the nationalization of municipal police forces located in areas with high concentrations of national minorities, and in both countries jurisdictions were stretched to ensure the institutional domination of the ethnic majority over the policing of ‘unreliable’ minorities. Furthermore, as Misiuk points out, in Poland concerns over the

national allegiance of the ethnic minorities could overlap with fears over Communism. The 'Red Menace' had a connotation in Poland that differed from the other countries in this collection, as Poles viewed calls from Moscow for the spread of the Communist revolution across Europe through the spectrum of historic Russian expansionism. Soviet efforts to exploit political, social and ethnic divisions within Poland only reinforced this perception, thereby increasing the attractiveness of an authoritarian solution to Poland's problems amongst the police, armed forces and sectors of the general public for whom internal unrest was equated, not with domestic social and political problems, but rather with the machinations of the external enemies of the Polish nation.

The significant increases in police personnel in the face of political and social unrest, the emphasis on their militarization as a way to ensure discipline, as well as the increasing centralization of the structure of command in the wake of the First World War gave the impression amongst some sectors of opinion that little had changed in the approach to policing and public order after 1918. To a certain extent this was true. For example, liberal politicians continued to demonstrate a degree of wariness towards organized labor, which was understandable given the levels of social tension and political extremism of the period. Nonetheless, the traditional liberal ideal of policing – defined in terms of a professional, well-regulated police at the service of the community, the protector of the rights of the citizenry as opposed to an arbitrary force at the command of an absolute ruler – was always evident, and the realization of this ideal paralleled wider political developments. In Chapter 8, Dimcho N. Dimov describes the co-existence of these two tendencies in the policing policies of the various Bulgarian governments: that of a professional police dedicated to fighting and investigating crime, and that of the police acting in a more repressive, political capacity as the protector of the public order and the ruling elite. Dimov argues that, while the Bulgarian police increasingly adopted the latter role, it never completely lost its professional pretensions. The priority given to one tendency or the other was determined by the broader situation, and reflected the levels of conflict and instability faced by Bulgaria during the interwar period, and perhaps explains why even reformist, democratic governments such as those of the People's Bloc found themselves unable to radically reform the police apparatus of the Bulgarian state.

Nonetheless, concern for professionalization was more pronounced in democratic regimes. Longstanding demands by the lower classes for

greater participation and representation in the political process were given impetus in the wake of the sacrifices and carnage of the First World War, and the entry of social democratic parties into governments across Europe ensured that liberal regimes were no longer the monopolies of social and economic elites. This meant that the more democratic liberal parties gained important allies in their attempts to reform the police, reforms which were all the more necessary in the age of mass politics. Many liberal democratic governments found that they often had to overcome a history of popular antagonism and suspicion towards police, and, by extension, of the state itself. It was in this aspect that the importance of the police – that is, beyond that of protecting the existing regime – can be observed. Scandals over excessive police violence, such as in Casas Viejas in Spain (January 1933) and Clichy in France (March 1937), could and did contribute to the downfall of governments.¹¹ For those governments attempting to reformulate relations between the lower classes and the state, the continued heavy-handedness of the police, as well as a lack of enforcement of reformist legislation, proved highly damaging to their goal of winning the lower classes over to liberal parliamentary democracy. Yet, this was not a problem exclusive to democratic regimes. The case of Italy shows that, despite the ideological congruity between the regime and the majority of its police officers, the Fascist regime appeared to fare little better than its democratic contemporaries when it came to reforming police practices and motivating support for the enforcement of new Fascist legislation.

This difficulty in reforming the police was particularly acute when it came into conflict with vested institutional interests. In Chapter 9, Jos Smeets outlines the various frustrated efforts to reform and rationalize the structure of the Dutch police. Inter-force rivalries combined with fears over antagonizing police opinion to stymie all attempts at reform. Instead, Dutch governments simply added another layer to the already overly complicated police apparatus by creating the paramilitary *Politietroepen* (Police Troops). Indeed, as Smeets points out, it was not until Nazi invasion and occupation of the Netherlands that the long-needed reform of the Dutch police finally was implemented.

While the benefits of the reform and modernization of the structure and practices of the police would seem obvious to most observers, there also could be a downside, even in a more politically stable country such as Britain. Joanne Klein describes in Chapter 10 how the modernization of the English police of Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester, while necessary, brought with it unforeseen consequences

like internal rivalries, and increased the burden of the average policeman, often without any significant increase in wages. These problems, coupled with the reluctance of municipal authorities to increase policing budgets and resources, strained the very basis of the classic English policing model: that of the policeman on the beat.

The collection of essays in this book are meant to demonstrate the complexity of the multitude of issues surrounding policing and public order faced by different European governments between the two world wars. While these issues were similar from one country to another, they were conditioned by the particular situation faced by any given government, as well as the ideological character of the ruling regime. Nonetheless, all of those countries covered in this book were faced with the same problem of re-constituting some sort of social and political equilibrium, and the police played a key role in the success or failure of this objective. What seems evident from the various studies presented here is that the situation faced by the different governments called for a level of pragmatism, as overly doctrinaire or ideological approaches to police reform could prove dangerously counterproductive. Yet, this was a difficult and controversial route to take in a Europe that had lost the certainties and confidence of the pre-1914 era and in demand of clear-cut and resolute solutions to a host of pressing and potentially explosive problems.

As for the police themselves, the increasing demands placed on them during this period – whether these be of a technological, political, law enforcement or public order nature – often provoked a variety of reactions. Policemen often acted in a defensive manner, whether this be to protect their livelihoods from would-be reformers, or to protect their own personal safety from those elements of ‘disorder’, particularly those from the Left, whose confrontational attitude would ‘provoke’ violent clashes with the police. Thus, policemen would often side with those groups that were sympathetic to police grievances and sensibilities, and whose political program called for effective action to curb the activities of those parties and organizations that disturbed the social peace. When democratic governments failed to take such energetic measures, police morale would dampen, and sympathies would gravitate to those political movements whose members would aid the police in dealing with the supposed Bolshevik danger. On the other hand, a government or regime that was willing to take decisive action to defend the political order would often retain the loyalties of its police forces. In this way, it was arguably the situation on the ground, more than that of training in the academy or various efforts to maintain dis-

cipline, that determined police responses to the social and political tensions of the day.

Notes

1. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (London, 1970), p. 48.
2. Quoted in Hsi-huey Liang, *The Rise of the Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 226.
3. Quoted in Hsi-huey Liang, *The Berlin Police Force in the Weimar Republic* (Berkeley, CA, 1970), p. 96.
4. Philip J. Stead, *The Police of France* (London, 1983), pp. 81–8; Liang, *The Rise of the Modern Police*, pp. 259–60.
5. For a discussion of the 1918–19 police strikes, as well as the police legislation implemented in its wake, see G.W. Reynolds, *The Night the Police Went on Strike* (London, 1968). The Lloyd George quotation can be found on page 70.
6. Quoted in Chris Wrigley, 'The state and the challenge of labour in Britain, 1917–1920', in C. Wrigley (ed.), *Challenges of Labour: Central and Western Europe, 1917–1920* (London, 1993), pp. 278–9.
7. Tom Bowden, *Beyond the Limits of the Law: A Comparative Study of the Police in Crisis Politics* (Harmondsworth, 1978), p. 156; Clive Emsley, *Policing and Its Context, 1750–1870* (London, 1983), p. 96; Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 120–5.
8. Robert Gildea, *The Third Republic from 1870–1914* (London, 1988), pp. 1–9.
9. Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison, WI, 1995), p. 111.
10. For a discussion of police collusion and sympathy for fascism in Italy prior to the March on Rome, see Jonathan Dunnage, *The Italian Police and the Rise of Fascism: A Case Study of the Province of Bologna, 1897–1925* (Westport, CT, 1997).
11. Paul Preston, *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Spanish Second Republic* (London, 1994), pp. 109–19; Simon Kitson, 'The police and the Clichy Massacre, March 1937' in Richard Bessel and Clive Emsley (eds.), *Patterns of Provocation: Police and Public Disorder* (New York & Oxford, 2000), pp. 35–6.

Index

- Abegg, Wilhelm, 73, 82
Alcalá Zamora, Niceto, 33, 37, 50, 52, 60
Almeida, António José de, 97–101, 105–6
Arendt, Hannah, 2
Arnedo, 42, 46, 63–4n45
Assault Guard (Spain), 38, 41–2, 50, 55–6, 63n44, 65–6n69, 66n73, 68n101
Azaña, Manuel, 38, 40, 53, 55, 58
- Bedaía de la Cavallería, General Cecilio, 51
Bereza Kartuska (Polish concentration camp), 168–9
Bertillon, Alphonse, 23
Besteiro, Julián, 38
Bocchini, Arturo, 115, 118–19, 121, 123, 125
Boris III of Bulgaria, 176, 186–8, 189
Boulanger, General Georges, 20, 28n22
Braun, Otto, 70
Brigades Mobiles Régionales de Police Judiciaire (aka Tigre Brigades, France), 23–4
Bulgarian Agricultural National Union (BANU), 174, 176–9, 183–4
- Cabanellas Ferrer, General Miguel, 40, 62n31
Calvo Sotelo, José, 56
Carabineros (Spanish customs and frontier police), 58, 62–3n32, 68n100
Carabinieri (Italy), 113–14, 117, 123–5
Casas Viejas, 11, 49, 65–6
Castilblanco, 42, 46, 54, 63n45
Castillo, Lieutenant José del, 55
CEDA (Spanish authoritarian Catholic party), 49–52, 58
- Centrolew* (anti-Piłsudski opposition movement, Poland), 167
Chagas, João, 91
Chiappe, Jean, 2, 18, 27
Civil Guard (Spain), 33–4, 37–42, 45–9, 50–7, 63–4n45, 67n85, 68n101
Clemenceau, Georges, 23
Clichy, 11, 22, 29
Communist parties
 Bulgaria, 176, 177, 179, 182, 184, 188
 France, 22
 Netherlands, 204
Community Police (Poland), 161–2, 164
Condés Romero, Captain Fernando, 55, 67
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labor, Spanish anarcho-syndicalist union), 34, 44–6, 48, 59, 65
Costa, Afonso, 91–4, 98
Cuerpo de Policía Local (Local Police Corps, Spain), 41, 63n38
Cuerpo de Seguridad (Security Corps, Spain), 36–7, 41–2, 50, 56, 61n14, 68n101
Cuerpo de Vigilancia (Surveillance Corps, Spain), 37
Cuerpo de Vigilantes de Caminos (Highway Patrol, Spain), 41
Cunha Leal, Francisco Pinto da, 103–4
Czechoslovak Legion, 8, 146–50
- Darjavnata Politizija* (Bulgarian State Police), 172–5, 179–82, 184–5, 187
Daudet, Phillipe, 20, 28n19
De los Reyes, Second Lieutenant Anastasio, 55

- De los Ríos, Fernando, 38
 Democratic Alliance (Bulgaria), 178–83
 Democratic Party (Portugal), 6, 90–107
 Dmowski, Roman, 9, 161
 Donner, Jan, 203, 206–7
- Ebert, Friedrich, 71
- Falcão, Silvestre, 92
 Ferdinand I of Bulgaria, 174, 176
 Fernandes Costa, Francisco José, 98–9
 Fey, Major Emil, 2
 Fiocca, Francesco, 116–17
 Fouché, Joseph, 14, 18, 19
 Franco, General Francisco, 51
Freikorps, 71–2
- Galán, Captain Francisco, 55, 67*n*96
 Galarza, Ángel, 40–1
Garde Républicaine Mobile (France), 21, 27
Gemeentepolitie (Dutch municipal police), 194–5, 199, 200–2, 206, 208
Gemeenteveldwachter (Dutch village constabulary), 194–5, 199
 Gendarmerie
 Bulgaria, 177–8
 Czechoslovakia, 139, 146
 France, 23
 Italy, *see* Carabinieri
 Netherlands, *see* Koninklijke Marechaussee
 Poland, 162, 164
 Portugal, *see* Guarda Nacional Republicana
 Spain, *see* Civil Guard
 George, David Lloyd, 3
 Georgiev, Colonel Kimon, 185–6
 Geusau, George A.A.A., 196
 Gil Robles, José María, 52, 58
 Goebbels, Joseph, 2
 Goseling, Carel, 209–10
 Granjo, António, 102–3
Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR, Portugal), 6–7, 9, 90–107
- Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza* (Public Security Guards, Italy), 114, 116–126, 129, 130–1
Guardie Regie (Royal Guard, Italy), 113–14
- Haeften, General G.A. van, 197
 Heemskerck, Theo, 194–7
 Heins, Captain J.Th., 197
 Henderson, Arthur, 3–4
 Hennion, Célestin, 23, 25
 Hidalgo, Diego, 51
HMS Seven Provinces, 203–4
 Houten, Captain M.C. van, 201–2
 Hozzowski, Wiktor, 162
Hramada (Byelorussian peasant movement), 167–8
- Independent Peasants Party (Poland), 167–8
 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), 178, 183
 International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), 163, 187, 201–2
 Italian Fascist Party, 7, 112–5, 120–6, 128, 130
- Jaroslav, Václav, 147
 Jordaán, 204–5
- Kiernick, Włodzimierz, 164
 Kioseivanov, Georgi, 186–7
Koninklijke Marechaussee (Dutch Royal Marechaussee), 194–211
Kriminalpolizei (German Criminal Investigation Service), 80–1
- Langeron, Roger, 18
 Largo Caballero, Francisco, 48, 54–5
 Law for the Defense of the Republic (Spain), 43–4
 Law for the Extermination of Banditry (Bulgaria), 177–8, 183
 Law for the Protection of the State (Bulgaria), 179, 182–3, 185–6
 Lépine, Louis, 21–2
 Lerroux, Alejandro, 49–50

- Liberal Republican Party (Portugal),
 98, 100–1
 Lisbon, 93–4, 101–2, 107

 Malinov, Alexander, 183–4
 Martínez Barrio, Diego, 50
 Martínez Saura, Santos, 53
 Maura, Miguel, 33, 35, 37–8, 41, 60*n*3
 Menéndez, Arturo, 37
 Miles, Sergeant George, 219
 Military League (*Voenen Suyuz*,
 Bulgaria), 176–7, 185, 187
 Military Police (Habsburg-Czech),
 145–6
 Municipal police
 Bulgaria, 173–4, 179–80, 186–7
 Czechoslovakia, 142–3, 151–3
 England (Birmingham, Liverpool
 and Manchester), 216–31
 France, 16–17, *see also* Prefecture of
 Police (Paris)
 Netherlands, *see* Gemeentepolitie
 and Gemeenteveldwachter
 Poland, 160–1
 Spain, *see* Cuerpo de Policía Local
 Muñoz Grandes, Lieutenant Colonel
 Agustín, 50, 66*n*73
 Mushanov, Nikola, 183–4
 Mussolini, Benito, 7, 28, 114, 122–3,
 130–1, 134*n*48

 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 164
 National Democracy Party (Poland),
 161–4
 National Union of Police and Prison
 Officers (NUPPO), 218
 Nelken, Sigmund, 76–7, 78–82, 84–6
 Non-Partisan Bloc for Cooperation
 with the Government (Poland),
 166–7

*Opera Vigilanza e Repressione dell’
 Antifascismo* (OVRA), 112, 115,
 122, 128
 Orange Guard (Bulgaria), 177–8
 Oss, 207–11

 Pablo Blanco y Torres, Joaquín de, 52
 Pais, Major Sidónio, 94–5

 Paris, 16–8, 21, 23
 Pereira, Domingos, 99
 People’s Bloc (Bulgaria), 10, 183–5
 People’s Militia (Poland), 160, 162
 Phillipe, Jean, 26, 30
 Piast Party (Polish peasant party),
 164, 169
 Pieracki, Colonel Bronislaw, 168
 Piłsudski, Field Marshal Józef, 9,
 159–60, 165–8
 Pimenta de Castro, General Joaquim,
 93–4
 Pinto, Colonel Liberato, 96–102, 106
 Ploegmakers, J., 208–9
 Police, *see* Gendarmerie, Municipal
 Police, State Police,
 Political/Investigative Police
Policja Państwowa (Polish State
 Police), 9, 161–70
 Political/Investigative police
 Bulgaria, 174–5, 179–80, 182–3,
 186–8
 France, 19–20, 22–4, *see also*
 Brigades Mobiles Régionales de
 Police Judiciaire
 Germany, *see* Kriminalpolizei
 Italy, 114–15, *see also* Opera
 Vigilanza e Repressione dell’
 Antifascismo (OVRA)
 Netherlands, 196, 201–2
 Poland, 162–3, 166, 169
 Spain, *see* Cuerpo de Vigilancia
Politietroepen (Dutch Police
 Troops), 11, 196–8, 200, 204–6,
 211
 Popular Alliance (*Naroden Sgovor*,
 Bulgaria), 178–83
 Popular Front
 Bulgaria, *see* People’s Bloc
 France, 15, 25
 Spain, 52–7
 Portela Valladares, Manuel, 52
 Pozas Perea, General Sebastián, 52, 55
 Prefecture of Police (Paris), 17–18,
 19–20, 22
 Prieto, Indalecio, 38
 Primo de Rivera, General Miguel,
 32–3, 40–1
 Prince, Albert, 20, 28*n*20

- Radical Republican Party (Radicals, Spain), 34, 49–52, 58, 62
- Radoslavov, Vassil, 175
- Ribeiro, General Encarnção, 94
- Rijksveldwacht* (Dutch State Police), 194–6, 199–200, 202–3, 205–8, 211
- Romita, Giuseppe, 129
- Sá Cardoso, Alfredo de, 97
- Sanjurjo, General José, 33, 49, 60*n*6, 62*n*31
- Salazar Alonso, Rafael, 51
- Schaik, Josef van, 205–7
- Schneickert, Hans, 82–6
- Schutzpolizei* (German Security Police), 71, 81
- Secreti, Riccardo, 118, 126–9
- Severing, Carl, 70, 72
- Sicherheitspolizei* (German Security Police, 1918–1921), 71, 74–5, 80–1
- Sikorski, Władysław, 164
- Silva, António Maria da, 97, 103–4
- Skrudlik, Marian, 164
- Socialist/Social Democratic parties
- Britain (Parliamentary Labour Party), 3–4
 - Bulgaria, 174, 182, 187
 - Germany, 70–3, 84
 - Netherlands, 193–5, 198
 - Poland, 160
 - Spain, 34, 36, 46, 50–1
- Somatén* (Spanish-Catalan right-wing militia), 40
- Speyart van Woerden, E., 208–10
- Stamboliiski, Alexander, 176–8
- Staní Policie* (Czechoslovak State Police), 137–55
- State Police
- Bulgaria, *see* Darjavnata Politizia
 - Czechoslovakia, *see* Staní Policie
 - France, *see* Sûreté Générale
 - Germany, *see* Schutzpolizei *and* Sicherheitspolizei
 - Italy, *see* Guardia di Pubblica Sicurezza
 - Netherlands, *see* Rijksveldwacht
 - Poland, *see* Policja Państwowa
 - Spain, *see* Cuerpo de Seguridad *and* Assault Guard
- Stavinsky, Alexandre, 18, 20, 27*n*13, 28*n*20
- Sûreté Générale (France), 16–18, 20, 23
- Švelha, Antonin, 136, 147, 150
- Troelstra, Pieter Jelles, 193–5
- Tsankov, Alexander, 178, 185
- Uribarri Barutell, Captain Manuel, 55
- Valdivia y García-Borrón, José, 50–1
- Velchev, Colonel Damian, 185–7
- Vermeulen, Lieutenant Colonel J.G.C., 197
- Vichy regime, 5, 18, 22, 24–7
- Vidarte, Juan-Simeón, 55, 64*n*57
- Vossische Zeitung*, 73, 77, 78, 86
- Welter Commission, 202–3
- Wilde, Jacob Adriaan de, 205
- Wojciechowski, Stanisław, 161
- Young, George, 2
- Zugazagoitia, Julián, 57
- Zveno* (Chain-link, Bulgarian fascist party), 185–7